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I. INTRODUCTION
In McGann v. H & H Music Co.,1 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit enraged AIDS activists2 and alarmed em-
ployees nationwide when it ruled that an employer could effectively
"discriminate," albeit indirectly, against employees with life threaten-
ing diseases by decreasing the caps on health benefits to nearly noth-
ing. Recently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in
the matter allowing the decisions of the district and circuit courts to
stand.3 This Note analyzes the decision and rationale of the Fifth Cir-
cuit. A brief factual background of the case is given, followed by a
discussion of the basic requirements of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 19744 as it applies to employee benefit plans.
The Note will then address the proper scope, purpose, and effect of
Section 510 of ERISA, upon which McGann based his claim. The Note
will conclude that while the Fifth Circuit's decision may seem viscer-
ally and fundamentally unfair, it would result in far greater unfair-
ness to the majority of the participants of the plan to require plan
benefits to vest. Thus, the circuit court's decision was a correct read-
ing of the law, and for the United States Supreme Court to have ruled
otherwise would have been an act of judicial legislation. The Note
concludes by addressing the statutory responses to McGann5 and the
possible effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act upon future sim-
ilar situations.6
1. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
2. Cornelius Baker, Public Policy and Education Director for the National Associa-
tion of People with AIDS, has denounced the circuit court's ruling as "shameful."
Joyce Price, White House Says Employer Can Cut AIDS Benefits, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1992, at A3. Jeff Levi, Director of Government Affairs for the AIDS Ac-
tion Coalition, described the Bush Administration's approval of the Fifth Circuit
decision as "very foolish." Id.; see also James R. Bruner, AIDS and ERISA
Preemptions: The Double Threat, 41 DuKE L.J. 1115 (1992); Carl A. Greci, Use It
and Lose It: The Employer's Absolute Right under ERISA Section 510 To Engage
in Post-CZaim Modifications of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 68 IND. L.J. 177
(1993); Eric C. Sohlgren, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against AIDS
Victims: Falling Through the Cracks of Federal Law-ERISA, the Rehabilitation
Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1247 (1991).
3. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 482 (1992).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)[hereinafter ERISA].
5. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 108-42 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
John McGann had been an employee of H & H Music Company
since 1982. During his employment, McGann had been covered by H
& H's group medical care plan, which was administered by Brook
Mays Music Company.7 Prior to July 31, 1988, the General American
Life Insurance Company8 provided medical benefits to the employees
of H & H. H & H accordingly provided to its employees a Summary
Plan Description ("SPD")9 of the plan. The plan provided lifetime
coverage for up to $1,000,000 for a catastrophic illness; however, the
SPD expressly stated that "the plan sponsor could terminate or
amend the plan at any time or terminate any benefit under the plan at
any time."10 Thus, the employees of H & H were put on notice that at
any time their medical benefits could be changed or withdrawn.
In December of 1987, McGann discovered that he was afflicted with
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS").11 He soon
thereafter made his condition known to H & H and submitted his first
claims for reimbursement under the plan.
On July 28, 1988, Brook Mays exercised its right to terminate the
health benefit plan covering H & H employees and announced that a
new group medical plan was to supplant the original plan. Unlike the
terminated plan, which was a fully insured group medical plan pro-
vided by General American, the new employee benefit plan was self-
insured.12 Additionally, the new plan decreased benefits payable for
AIDS related claims from the former lifetime benefits of $1,000,000 to
$5,000.13
McGann soon expended the $5,000 worth of benefits under the new
plan. He then filed suit against H & H, Brook Mays, and General
7. Brook Mays Music Company was a named defendant in the case before the dis-
trict court, the circuit court, and in the Petition for Certiorari.
8. General American was also a named defendant; however, this Note will not ad-
dress the viability of the claims against General American.
9. The SPD is mandated by ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1)(1988). See in-
fra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
10. Brief of Respondent General American Life Ins. Co. Opposing Petition for Certi-
orari at 4 (No. 91-1283).
11. AIDS is the final and at this time fatal stage of complications caused by the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). See generally John R. Austin and Re-
becca S. Trammell, AIDS and the Criminal Justice System: An Annotated Bibli-
ography, 11 N. ILL. L. REv. 481 (1991); John F. Dudley, Comment, The Medical
Costs of AIDS: Abandoning the HI V-Infected Employee, 30 DUQUESNE L. REv. 915
(1992).
12. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 10, at 4.
13. The Respondents alleged several important additional changes in the policy;
namely, deductible and "stop loss" increases, employee contribution increases,
exclusion for treatment of substance abuse and the addition of a Preferred Pro-
vider Organization Network. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 10, at 5. The
only illnesses which were excluded, however, were AIDS related illnesses.
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American, alleging violations of ERISA Section 51014 and several state
law claims.15 The defendants immediately moved for summary judge-
ment,16 which the district court granted.17 McGann then appealed the
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The majority of this Note will analyze the decision of the circuit court
and the propriety of its affirmance of the district court's order of sum-
mary judgement.
A. Background of ERISA
ERISA was introduced into law in 1974, seven years after its initial
introduction and three years after an intensive Congressional investi-
gation into the abuses of private pension and employee benefit plans.' 8
The stated purpose of ERISA was to "protect ... the interests of par-
ticipants in employee benefit plans ... by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee ben-
efit plans and by providing for appropriate remedies ... and ready
access to the Federal courts."' 9 Congress enacted ERISA primarily to
protect "the continued well-being and security of millions of employ-
ees and their dependents [who] are directly affected by [employee ben-
efit] plans."20
1. ERISA Preempts All State Laws Which Relate to Employee
Benefit Plans.
Pursuant to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,2 ' federal law will preempt state law to the extent that the federal
14. See ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
15. The state law claims were not discussed in the district court's order on the Re-
spondent's Motion for Summary Judgement; presumably, all state law claims
were dismissed because they were preempted by ERISA. See ERISA § 514, 29
U.S.C. § 1144. See generally infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text. In any
event, McGann did not raise the applicability of any state claims on appeal. See
McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
16. In federal court, summary judgement is proper only if there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of
law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. One commentator has expressed the view that the fact
that McGann's illness was the catalyst for the employer's decision to modify the
plan benefits in and of itself raises a genuine issue of material fact and that sum-
mary judgment was improper. See Greci, supra note 2, at 190-91.
17. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
18. See generally RONALD. J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1.01, at 1-2
(1989).
19. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(1988).
20. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1988).
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. The clause provides in pertinent part: "This Constitu-
tion, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land..,.."
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law clearly expresses Congress' preemptive intent.22 Federal preemp-
tion "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in
the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and pur-
pose." 23 An explicit expression of preemptive intent is found in ER-
ISA Section 514,24 which provides that ERISA "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may... relate to any employee bene-
fit plan."25
ERISA's sweeping preemption provision originated in the Confer-
ence Committee's resistance to the more limited preemption statutes
originally proposed by the House and Senate. The House version of
Section 514 originally limited the preemptive scope of the statute to
only those areas of state regulation expressly covered by the bil.26
The initial Senate proposal provided for preemption of state laws re-
lating to subject matters regulated by the bill.27
The Conference Committee resolved the discrepancies between
the two proposed versions by rejecting both alternatives in favor of the
present language of Section 514(a).28 The Committee intended that
the preemptive scope of Section 514(a) was to be as broad as possible,
and both houses eventually accepted the conferees' proposal.29 The
rationale for this type of broad, overriding preemption was expressed
22. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
23. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983)(quoting Jones v. Rath Pack-
ing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
24. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988).
25. Id-
26. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1974). The pertinent language of the proposed stat-
ute stated:
(a) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that... the
provisions of part I of this subtitle shall supersede any and all laws of the
States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities and fidu-
ciary responsibilities ....
(c) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that the
provisions of parts 2, 3 and 4 of this subtitle shall supersede any and all
laws of the States and of political subdivisions thereof as they may now
or hereafter relate to the nonforfeitability of a participant's benefits in
employee benefit plans .... the funding requirement for such plans, the
adequacy of financing such plans, portability requirements for such
plans, or the insurance of pension benefits under such plans.
120 CONG. REC. 5002 (1974).
27. H.R. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The Senate version provided:
(a) PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAWS - It is hereby declared to be the
express intent of Congress that.., the provisions of this Act or the Wel-
fare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act shall supersede any and all laws
of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act ....
120 CONG. REC. 5002 (1974).
28. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1988).
29. 120 CONG. REC. 29216, 29963 (1974).
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as the need to "eliminat[e] the threat of inconsistent State and local
regulation of employee benefit plans,"30 and the necessity of avoiding
"the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action
that might impinge on Federal regulation." 3 ' At least one commenta-
tor has concluded that Congress had a secondary, unexpressed inten-
tion-to motivate employers to offer benefits. Without strong federal
preemption, the conflicting state regulation and the inevitable litiga-
tion over conflicting provisions of state and federal law would discour-
age employers from adopting or maintaining employee benefit plans.3 2
The preemptive effect of ERISA is therefore noted for its
breadth,33 and courts have consistently found preemption even if a
state law only affects an employee benefit plan indirectly or peripher-
ally.34 Thus, a state law which would restrict employers from denying
benefits for AIDS, or which would prohibit employers from changing
30. 120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974).
31. Id. at 29942.
32. Stephen R. Snodgrass, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate
To" in Section 514, 58 WASH. U. LAW. QUARTERLY 143, 150-51 (1980).
33. The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe pre-emption clause is conspicuous for
its breadth." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990). See also Francis v.
United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (stating that ER-
ISA is intended to effect the broadest possible preemption of state law). ERISA's
preemptive effect is so broad that it preempts state law even in the absence of a
federal remedy under ERISA: "The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of
certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be
completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to
obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA." Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). See also First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992)(holding that
argument that ERISA provides inadequate remedy will not overcome preemp-
tion); Lee v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1990)(ER-
ISA preempts state law claims without regard to whether ERISA provides
remedy for alleged wrong); Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990)("[w]hile our holding here will leave [the plaintiff]
without a remedy, the availability of a federal remedy is not a prerequisite for
federal preemption."); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir.
1989)(state law claims preempted despite claim that alleged employer misconduct
constituted a "betrayal without remedy"); Olson v. General Dynamics Corp., 960
F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 2968 (1992) (any gap between
remedies provided under state vs. federal law is concern of Congress); Phillips v.
Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1016
(1987)(ERISA preempts state law even in absence of federal remedy); Contra In-
ternational Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 298 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2941 (1992)(ERISA will not preempt state law claims
based on wrongs for which ERISA provides no remedy).
34. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983)(stating that "[a] law 're-
lates to' an employee benefit plan.., if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan"). See also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-25
(1981)(holding that a state law prohibiting pension plans from offsetting workers'
compensation benefits indirectly regulates an ERISA plan and therefore is pre-
empted by ERISA).
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or terminating the terms of employee benefit plans would clearly "re-
late to" employee benefit plans and would be preempted by Section
514.35
2. Employers Can Escape State Regulation of Insurance by Self-
Funding Employee Benefit Plans.
ERISA contains an important exception to its broad preemption
provision. Section 514(b)(2)(A),36 commonly known as the "insurance
savings clause," exempts from federal preemption "any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking or securities."37 ERISA con-
tains another exception to the savings clause, referred to as the
"deemer clause," which provides that "an employee benefit plan...
shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer...
or to be engaged in the business of insurance... for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, [or] in-
surance contracts."3 8 The practical effect of the interaction between
the savings clause and the deemer clause is that ERISA prevents
states from indirectly regulating self-insured employee benefit plans
by treating those plans as insurers under state law.
The Supreme Court initially interpreted the insurance savings and
deemer clauses in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.3 9
In Metropolitan Life, the Court held that a state statute which re-
quired minimum mental health care benefits in group health policies
"regulated insurance" within the meaning of ERISA and was there-
fore saved from preemption. 40 As part of its analysis, the Court in
dicta distinguished between insured and self-insured plans: Had Con-
gress intended preemption to reach state regulation of insurance con-
tracts, "it would have been unnecessary for the deemer clause
explicitly to exempt such laws from the saving clause when they are
applied directly to benefit plans."41 In drawing the distinction, the
Court implicitly sanctioned a dichotomous treatment of fully insured
plans as opposed to self-funded plans, in that insured plans are subject
to indirect regulation by state law while self-insured plans escape such
state regulation.42
What was merely hinted at in Metropolitan Life soon found ex-
plicit expression in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.43 In Holliday, the Court
35. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988).
36. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(1988).
37. Id
38. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C § 1144(b)(2)(B)(1988).
39. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
40. 1& at 758.
41. Id. at 741.
42. Id. at 747.
43. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
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expressly recognized the distinction between insured and self-insured
plans: "By recognizing a distinction between insurers of plans and the
contracts of those insurers, which are subject to direct state regula-
tion, and self-insured employee benefit plans governed by ERISA,
which are not, we observe Congress' presumed desire to reserve to the
States the regulation of the 'business of insurance.' "44
The result of the distinction between insured and self-insured
plans has been that employers have escaped the mandates of state reg-
ulation by self-insuring their employee benefit plans.45 Therefore, the
employee's exclusive remedy for alleged violations of self-funded
plans is under ERISA's civil enforcement procedures,46 and unless
ERISA itself prevents employers from changing the terms of em-
ployee benefit plans under Section 510, which contains no vesting pro-
vision, the employee will have no cause of action.
3. Civil Enforcement of ERISA
Section 502(a)47 of ERISA allows a plan participant to bring a civil
action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
44. Id. at 63.
45. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 901 F.2d 446, 454 (5th Cir.
1990)(holding that self-insured benefit plans are not subject to state regulation of
insurance); Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 184 (8th Cir. 1989) (self-funded plan not
subject to even indirect state regulatioA). The result of § 514 has been described
as "semi-preemption" because "the statute has been read to mean that the states
can regulate employer-provided health insurance if the employer buys it from an
insurance company but not if the employer self-insures." Daniel M. Fox &
Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA. Legislative Process and Health
Policy, 7 AmERiCAN J. TAX PoLicY 47, 48 (1988).
McCann offers an illustration of the attractions of self-funded plans. Subse-
quent to McGann, Texas enacted the following statute:
(a) ... [Ain insurer that delivers or issues for delivery an accident and
sickness insurance policy in this state may not cancel that policy during
its term because the insured has been diagnosed as having or has been or
is being treated for HIV or AIDS....
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.70-3A (Supp. 1993). There are two fundamental flaws in
statutes of this kind. First, the language "during its term" suggests that the em-
ployer may reserve the right to terminate the plan, thus ending its term. To the
extent that plan termination is prohibited, the employer may simply offer plans
with very short terms. On a more practical level, an employer can simply self-
fund its plans, as did H & H, and therefore escape state regulation through the
preemptive effect of ERISA. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
46. "[T]he civil enforcement provisions of ERISA... were meant to 'be the exclusive
vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting [ER-
ISA violations], and that varying state causes of action for claims within the scope
of [§ 1132(a)] would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.'"
In re Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1988)(quoting Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)(citations omitted)).
47. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1988).
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to future benefits under the terms of the plan."48 The procedures con-
tained within ERISA are intended to be the exclusive remedies for
violations of rights under ERISA.49 The language of Section 502 is
critical and precise: If an employer denies an employee a benefit or
right guaranteed under the terms of an existing plan, the employee
may pursue a remedy under Section 502(a).
For Section 502(a) to apply, however, there must be an enforceable
right under an existing plan.5 0 If an employer amends the benefits of
an existing plan, and there are no restrictions on such a modification,
the employee has no greater "rights" than the terms which the
amended plan provides. This reasoning applies afortiori to a situation
where an employer terminates a plan. Presuming the termination of
the plan is not itself a violation, upon termination of the plan there are
no continued rights under the "terms" of the plan to enforce. Thus, a
prerequisite to a successful suit under Section 502(a) is an enforceable
right under an existing plan. The principles of vesting with regard to
ERISA plans are central to the determination of the existence of an
existing, enforceable right.
4. ERISA Requires No Vesting of Employee Benefits
ERISA covers both pension plans5l and welfare benefit plans52 and
distinguishes between two types of plan benefits: retirement or pen-
sion benefits,53 which are vested, and ancillary or employment bene-
fits, which are nonvested.5 4  The difference between vested and
48. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)(1988).
49. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
50. In some instances, an employer's act which is intended to keep an employee from
becoming entitled to a benefit under a plan will trigger a cause of action under
ERISA. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that the prototypical claim
intended to be covered by Section 510 is one where the employee's "termination
[is] motivated by an employer's desire to prevent a pension from vesting." Inger-
soll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990). While the action of the
employer in such a circumstance does not involve an existing benefit, it does in-
volve an existing right to future, vested benefits. Furthermore, courts have not
been reluctant to find a violation of § 510 in cases involving employee termina-
tion. See infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
51. Because McGann dealt solely with welfare benefit plans, pension plans and cov-
erage thereof are beyond the scope of this Note.
52. ERISA describes a welfare benefit plan as "any plan, fund, or program... main-
tained by an employer... for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise... medical, surgi-
cal, or hospital care... or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
[or] death." ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(1988). A plan participant is "any
employee or former employee of an employer.., who is or may become eligible
to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers em-
ployees of such employer." ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)(1988).
53. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(1988).
54. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(1988).
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nonvested benefits is crucial to the employee attempting to recover
under Section 510.
In enacting ERISA, Congress mandated that pension employees
have vested, nonforfeitable rights to a certain percentage of their ben-
efits depending on the number of years the employee had worked. 55
Welfare benefits, in contrast, are nonvested benefits.56 The rationale
for the exemption from the protection of vesting has been described as
an inducement to employers to provide benefits. While vesting re-
quirements would not deter employers from forming pension plans
because the costs are easy to estimate, applying the vesting provision
to the unpredictable and unforeseeable expenses of welfare benefits
would discourage employers from offering these benefits in the first
place.57
ERISA regulates pension plans far more extensively than welfare plans. For
example, welfare plans are expressly exempted from the Act's detailed mini-
mum participation, vesting and benefit-accrual requirements and are not sub-
ject to ERISA's minimum-funding requirements. As explained by
Committees of both the House and Senate, the term "accrued benefit" refers
to pension or retirement benefits and is not intended to apply to certain ancil-
lary benefits, such as medical insurance or life insurance, which are some-
times provided for employees in conjunction with a pension plan, and are
sometimes provided separately. To require the vesting of these ancillary ben-
efits would seriously complicate the administration and increase the cost of
plans whose primary function is to provide retirement income.5 8
Another basic difference between pension benefits and welfare
benefits is that unlike pension benefits, ERISA does not afford wel-
fare benefits any special protection5 9 outside of the terms of the con-
55. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988).
56. ERISA explicitly provides that the requirements of minimum vesting standards
do not apply to employee benefit plans. See ERISA § 201(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1051(1)(1988).
57. See Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988).
58. Id- at 491 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4670, 4726).
59. ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements apply to employee benefit plans.
ERISA § 101(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a)(1988). ERISA's fiduciary duties similarly ap-
ply to the plan administrators. ERISA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
McGann could not, however, claimed a breach of fiduciary duty under Section
402; courts have unanimously held that the termination or modification of a plan
will not trigger ERISA's fiduciary standards. See Senn v. United Dominion In-
dus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 817 (7th Cir. 1992)(stating that the establishment, termi-
nation, or amendment of a benefit plan is not to be judged by fiduciary
standards); Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 948-49 (6th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 517 (1990) (company does not act in fiduciary capacity when
deciding to amend or terminate plan benefits); Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
889 F.2d 1346, 1349 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 43 (1990)(employer vio-
lates no fiduciary duty by amending non-vested plan benefits); Musto v. Ameri-
can Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020
(1989)("when an employer decides to establish, amend, or terminate a benefits
plan.., its actions are not to be judged by fiduciary standards"); Jones v. AT & T
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tract between the employer and employee.6 0 Thus, the terms of the
contract will govern the offering and termination of the benefits. The
result of the exemption of vesting requirements is that in the absence
of an enforceable agreement to the contrary, an employer remains
free to amend or eliminate health plan benefits.61
The contract referred to is comprised of the description of the plan,
which is required to be distributed, as well as a detailed underlying
plan. While ERISA contains no requirement that benefits under a
welfare plan vest, an employer can create an enforceable, binding
right to benefits under a plan through either a written obligation62 or
by failing to preserve the right to terminate or amend benefits.63
ERISA provides for explicit disclosure of the terms of plans on be-
half of employers by mandating that each participant in the plan re-
ceive a Summary Plan Description.64 ERISA requires the SPD to
include, among other things, a disclosure of benefits "sufficiently accu-
rate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan."65 The ob-
ligations and terms stated under the SPD and plan documents, how-
ever, exclusively govern an employer's obligations under ERISA
welfare plans, 66 and the mere termination of plan benefits, when not
Co., 798 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1992)(employer does not owe employees
fiduciary duty when it amends or terminates benefit plan).
60. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1109, 1125 (E.D. Mo. 1986),
aff'd, 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988).
61. See, e.g., Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1993 WL 64170 (5th Cir. 1993) (employer
possesses right to amend or terminate unvested benefits at any time absent con-
trary contractual provision); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 398 (11th
Cir. 1993)("[a]bsent contractual obligation, employers may decrease or increase
benefits")(citing Vasseur v. Halliburton Co., 950 F.2d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir.
1992)(employer may amend ERISA benefits absent contractual restriction));
Deibler v. United Food and Commercial Workers' Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206,
210 (3d Cir. 1992)(under ERISA, nonvested benefits may be reduced or elimi-
nated at any time); Reichelt v. Emhart Corp., 921 F.2d 425, 430 (2d Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2854 (1991)(stating that under ERISA employer has right at any
time to amend or terminate severance benefit plan); Alday v. Container Corp. of
Am., 906 F.2d 660, 666 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 675 (1991)(if SPD
reserves right, employer may amend or terminate benefits); Young v. Standard
Oil, 849 F.2d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988)(stating that an
employer may unilaterally terminate or amend employee welfare benefit plan
under ERISA).
62. See, e.g., Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir.
1988)(holding that statements in an employee benefit summary plan description
may be binding).
63. See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988)(stat-
ing that an employer may alter a welfare benefit plan when the summary plan
description reserves the right to amend or terminate benefits).
64. See generally ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1)(1988).
65. Id.
66. Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988).
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contrary to the terms of the SPD, will not create a cause of action.
The "summary plan description" booklet provides that [the employer], as the
plan's administrator, "may terminate *** the plan in whole or in part at any
time, subject to the applicable provisions of the group insurance policies."
Clearly, [the employer] was under no contractual obligation to refrain from
terminating the plan.... 'ERISA does not create liability on the part of the
employer who changes the kind of health plan provided to employees where
no contract prohibits or prevents such a change." 6 7
Therefore, if a plan meets the SPD regulation requirements of ER-
ISA, and if the SPD clearly provides that the employer may terminate
the plan at any time, the termination of the plan will not constitute a
violation of ERISA.
5. Section 510 Does Not Prohibit an Employer From
Terminating or Altering Plan Benefits.
McGann brought his claim under ERISA Section 510,68 which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, disci-
pline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan,
this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act [29 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.], or for the purpose of interfering with
the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act.
... 69
Section 510, therefore, contains two separate provisions under
which employees may bring a suit: discrimination for exercising any
right to which the participant is entitled under the provisions of the
existing plan, and discrimination for the purpose of interfering with a
right to which the participant may become entitled under an existing
plan.
McGann claimed that the defendants discriminated against him
within both prohibitions of Section 510.70 An examination of the facts
of McGann and the language of Section 510, however, reveals that
there was no violation of ERISA.
67. Hamilton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 1350, 1351 (8th Cir. 1985)(citing Hamilton
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 587 F. Supp. 521, 523 (E.D. Mo. 1984)). See also Tackitt v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 758 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1985)(stating that employ-
ers may reduce plan benefits based upon the unambiguous language of the plan
documents).
68. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
69. Id
70. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991).
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B. Analysis of McGann
1. McGann was not discriminated against for exercising a right
to which he was entitled under the plan.
Courts unanimously hold that in order to show that an employee
was discriminated against within the prohibitions of either provision
of Section 510, the employee first has the burden of proving not
merely the intent to discriminate against him in the terms of a plan,
but the employer's specific intent to discriminate in retaliation for the
employee's exercise of rights under the plan.l1 While it may seem dis-
ingenuous to allow discrimination in any form with regard to an ER-
ISA plan, the distinction between discrimination in the terms of a plan
and discrimination against an employee in retaliation for exercising
rights is critical, albeit subtle. The First Circuit has articulated the
difference. 72
[Section 510] relates to discriminatory conduct directed against individuals,
not to actions involving the plan in general. The problem is with the word
"discriminate." An overly literal interpretation of this Section would make
illegal any partial termination, since such terminations obviously interfere
with the attainment of benefits by the terminated group, and indeed, are ex-
pressly intended so to interfere.7 3
Therefore, an employer may discriminate against an employee, but
only in the terms of a benefit plan. If such discrimination were pro-
hibited, then an employer would be forever prevented from altering
the terms of a benefit plan, as some employees would potentially be
adversely affected by any change.
There is really no doubt that the changes in the plan were aimed at
McGann.74 However, the changes were made in a permissible fashion,
as they affected all employees in the terms of the new health plan.
Because the plan affected all employees, despite the fact that McGann
71. See, e.g., Kimbro v, Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct 53 (1990)(employee must prove employer's specific intent to re-
taliate for employee's exercise of rights under the plan); Clark v. Resistoflex Co.,
854 F.2d 762, 770 (5th Cir. 1988)(employee must prove specific intent to interfere
with employee's pension rights); Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108,
1111 (2d Cir. 1988)(section 510 claimant must prove specific intent to engage in
activity prohibited by section 510); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834,
851 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987)(claimant must prove specific intent
to violate ERISA).
72. See Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984).
73. Id. at 16.
74. McGann was the only employee afflicted with AIDS and thus was the only em-
ployee affected by the cap on AIDS-related illnesses. See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, at 6, Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992)(No. 91-
1183)[hereinafter Petition]. See also McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,
404 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991), where the court accepted that for the purposes of the
appeal that McGann was the only plan beneficiary known to have AIDS.
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was the only employee immediately affected by the change, all em-
ployees were discriminated against by the change.75 This interpreta-
tion of "discrimination" is wholly consistent with Congress' intent in
promulgating ERISA. Because the plan was an employee benefit plan
rather than a pension plan, it was not subject to any vesting require-
ments.76  The difference between vested pension benefits and
nonvested health benefits has consistently been recognized by the
courts.
Neither Congress nor the courts are involved in either the decision to estab-
lish a plan or in the decision concerning which benefits a plan should provide.
In particular, courts have no authority to decide which benefits employers
must confer upon their employees; these are decisions which are more appro-
priately influenced by forces in the market place and, when appropriate, by
federal legislation.7 7
Courts have interpreted the legislative history of ERISA to state
that Congress, in failing to provide vesting provisions with regard to
benefit plans, and in specifically requiring SPDs, but at the same time
declining to regulate the content of the SPDs, intended that benefit
plans could be subject to change at the whim of the employer provided
that the employer reserved that right in the SPD.78
Furthermore, courts which have found violations of Section 510
have invariably found that the employment relationship was termi-
nated, and not merely that the terms of the plan itself were changed.
In virtually all Section 510 cases involving employment benefits, the
challenged activity was not a change in the terms of the plan itself, but
rather a change in the employment relationship.
In Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales,79 the plaintiff sued her former
employer, alleging a violation of Section 510 for her termination. The
plaintiff argued that she was unlawfully terminated because she re-
75. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 113 S.
Ct. 482 (1992).
76. Pension plans, as opposed to employee benefit plans, are subject to strict vesting
requirements. See ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988). It should be noted that
even pension plans themselves may be terminated; the Single Employer Pension
Plan Amendment Act of 1986 created two types of voluntary plan termination -
standard and distress. Standard and distress termination are the exclusive means
of voluntary termination of single-employer pension plans. ERISA § 4041(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(1988). The assets of the plan are then distributed with the
allocation initially made (1) to the portion of the participant's benefit derived
from employee voluntary contributions and (2) to the portion of the participant's
benefit derived from employee mandatory contributions. ERISA §§ 4044(a)(1),
4044(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a)(1), 1344(a)(2)(1988). Therefore, the employees'
vested pension benefits are protected under ERISA even in the event of plan
termination.
77. Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried Employees, 740
F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984).
78. Id.
79. 985 F.2d 543 (11th Cir. 1993).
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fused to change her employment status from employee to independent
contractor. The change in status, in turn, would have eliminated her
participation in the health benefit plan. The court found that the ter-
mination was a violation under Section 510.80
In Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp.,8 1 the plaintiff brought suit pursuant
to Section 51082 and claimed that the defendant violated ERISA by
firing him in retaliation for his former wife's making a claim under
the existing plan.8 3 The court found that since the employment was
terminated in direct violation of the prohibitions of Section 510, the
plaintiff had stated a claim under ERISA.
Similarly, in Kross v. Western Electric Co., Inc.,84 the court found a
Section 510 claim based on the allegation that the plaintiff's employ-
ment was terminated to prevent the plaintiff's continued coverage
under Western Electric's medical and dental plans.85
Finally, in Folz v. Marriott Corp.,86 the court found an employer
liable under Section 510 for the discharge of a managerial level em-
ployee after the employer learned the employee suffered from multi-
ple sclerosis. Relying on Kross, the court held that the employer had
violated ERISA by terminating the employee for the sole reason of
depriving him of continued participation in the existing plan.8 7 In all
of the cited cases, the essential element of the cause of action was the
termination of employment rather than the termination of plan bene-
fits.88 The distinction has been succinctly articulated by the Seventh
Circuit:8 9
The exact parameters of § 510 have yet to be judicially established. It is
clear from the text of the statute, however, that § 510 was designed to protect
80. Id at 546 n.4. The Seaman court distinguished the facts of its case from McGann:
"The combined effect of our holding today and cases such as McGann is an inter-
pretation of ERISA that prohibits employers from discharging employees to
avoid paying benefits but permits employees to reduce or terminate non-vested
benefits simply by changing the terms of the plan." Id- at 546.
81. 882 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1989).
82. The plaintiff originally brought a suit in state court which was promptly removed
to federal court. The federal court construed the plaintiff's allegations under
ERISA § 510, despite the fact that the plaintiff had argued for the purposes of
defeating federal jurisdiction that no § 510 claim was intended. Id at 588-89.
83. Id. at 589.
84. 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 1242-43.
86. 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
87. Id at 1014-15.
88. Presumably, a flagrant suspension or imposition of a fine could also lead to a
§ 510 violation. If such were the case, the employment relationship may not itself
be affected in a fundamental way. However, an event such as the imposition of a
fine would fall, as would an employee termination, directly within the prohibi-
tions of § 510.
89. Deeming v. American Standard, Inc., 905 F.2d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990)(emphasis
omitted).
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the employment relationship against actions designed to interfere with, or dis-
criminate against, the attainment of a pension right. The language of the pro-
vision speaks specifically to discharge, fine, expulsion, suspension or
discrimination. Presumably, an employer may not, for example, make work-
ing conditions so unbearable that an employee is forced to quit soon before his
pension rights would, in normal course, vest. Simply put, § 510 was designed
to protect the employment relationship which gives rise to an individual's pen-
sion rights. West v. Butler, 612 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980).90 This means
that afundamental prerequisite to a § 510 action is an allegation that the em-
ployer-employee relationship, and not merely the pension plan, was changed
in some discriminatory or wrongful way.9 1
Therefore, according to existing case law in order to recover under
Section 510, a plaintiff must experience a detrimental change in the
employment relationship itself rather than merely a reduction in the
terms of a plan in order to maintain an action under Section 510.92 In
McGann, that crucial change in the employment relationship was
90. The Deeming court noted that "ERISA's legislative history... reveals that Con-
gress was concerned with the acts of unscrupulous employers who discharged and
harassed their employees in order to keep them from obtaining vested pension
rights." 905 F.2d 1124, 1127 n.2 (quoting Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 680-81
(9th Cir. 1983)).
91. 1d. at 1127 (emphasis added). See also McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d
1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1990)(employer's program to terminate employment prior to
benefits eligibility violated ERISA); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834,
865 (3d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987)(termination of employees prior
to benefit eligibility violated § 510); Rose v. Intelogic Trace, Inc., 652 F. Supp.
1328, 1330 (W.D. Tex. 1987)(termination to avoid vesting of benefits violates ER-
ISA). But see Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 793 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Colo.
1991)(stating that discharge of HIV-affected employee did not violate ERISA in
light of adequate business reasons to support discharge).
92. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text. See also Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976
F.2d 1319, 1327 (9th Cir. 1992)(antidiscrimination provision of ERISA does not
apply unless employee is actively or constructively discharged). But see Vogel v.
Independence Federal Savings Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Md. 1990). Vogel in-
volved a situation where the employer changed the terms of the plan to deny the
plaintiff benefits under the plan. The court found a violation of § 510. The Fifth
Circuit, however, found that Vogel was factually dissimilar from McGann in that
[n]othing in Vogel suggests that the change there had the potential to
then or thereafter exclude any present or possible future plan benefici-
ary other than the plaintiff. Vogel therefore provides no support for the
proposition that the alteration or termination of a medical plan could
alone sustain a section 510 claim. Without necessarily approving of the
holding in Vogel, we note that it is inapplicable to the instant case.
McGann v. H & H. Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1991).
The court was correct in its reluctance to follow Vogel. Vogel involved a case
where a plan was amended to include all employees save the plaintiff. The fact
that the plaintiff in Vogel was expressly and exclusively prohibited from partici-
pating in the new plan provided a much stronger argument under § 510 and is
clearly distinguishable from the facts of McGann, where the plan amendment did
not specifically exclude one employee. See also Taylor v. Bank One, Texas, N.A.,
137 B.R. 624, 642-43 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (defendant who attempted to provide benefits
to one specific group of participants while denying benefits to other participants
violated § 510).
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missing; McGann was never terminated or suspended within the
prohibitions of Section 510. Furthermore, McGann's rights to benefits
ended when H & H terminated the original plan.93 Once the plan no
longer existed, McGann could claim no rights to the benefits of the
original plan, regardless of his employment relationship with H & H.
Further, because the SPD provided by H & H specifically reserved
the right to terminate the existing plan at any time,94 McGann was
entitled to no rights under that plan once it was terminated. McGann
could show no specific intent on the part of H & H to discriminate
against him in retaliation for exercising a right under the plan once
the plan was terminated; therefore, the Fifth Circuit correctly held
that McGann could not prevail under the first prong of Section 510.95
2. McGann did not have any right to permanent benefits under
Section 510.
Under the second prong of Section 510, McGann claimed that H &
H discriminated against him "for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which [McGann] may become entitled."96
The Fifth Circuit correctly stated that "[t]he right referred to in the
second clause of section 510 is not simply any right to which an em-
ployee may conceivably become entitled, but rather any right to which
an employee may become entitled pursuant to an existing, enforceable
obligation assumed by the employer."97 Thus, for there to be interfer-
ence with the attainment of a right to which a beneficiary may become
entitled there must first be a plan providing for those rights.
H & H had no obligation to provide to its employees under the new
plan the same terms that were provided under the terminated plan.
Nothing in ERISA requires employer's to provide any particular bene-
fits. The Supreme Court has observed that "ERISA does not mandate
that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself pro-
scribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits."98 The
Sixth Circuit has similarly rejected the proposition that employers are
restricted in choosing the terms of their employee pension plans.99
93. The terms of the SPDs provided by the employers in Seaman, Fitzgerald, Kross,
and Folz were not set forth in the cases. Presumably, the employers could not
change the benefits of an existing plan because the SPDs contained no express
provisions providing for plan termination or modification, and therefore termi-
nating the employees was the only possible way to keep the employees from re-
ceiving their plan benefits.
94. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
95. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1991).
96. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
97. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1991)(emphasis added).
98. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983).
99. See Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program for Salaried Employees,
740 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
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In enacting ERISA, Congress continued its reliance on voluntary action by
employers by granting substantial tax advantages for the creation of qualified
retirement programs. Neither Congress nor the courts are involved in either
the decision to establish a plan or in the decision concerning which benefits a
plan should provide. In particular, courts have no authority to decide which
benefits employers must confer on their employees; these decisions are more
appropriately influenced by forces in the marketplace and when appropriate,
by federal legislation. Absent a violation of federal or state law, a federal
court may not modify a substantive provision of a pension plan.1 0 0
The Fifth Circuit recognized that McGann's interpretation of Sec-
tion 510 would "prevent an employer from reducing or eliminating
coverage for a particular illness in response to escalating costs of cov-
ering an employee suffering from that illness."01 McGann's interpre-
tation would alter the terms of the original plan offered by H & H,
which contemplated the termination of the plan, to a plan offering
permanent benefits. The court correctly refused to adopt such an
interpretation.
Instead of making the $1,000,000 limit available for medical expenses on an as-
incurred basis only as long as the limit remained in effect, the policy would
make the limit permanently available for all medical expenses as long as they
might thereafter be incurred because of a single event, such as the contracting
of AIDS. Under McGann's theory, defendants would be effectively proscribed
from reducing coverage for AIDS once McGann had contracted that illness
and filed claims for AIDS-related expenses. 1 02
The rationale embraced by McGann flies in the face of the Con-
gressional declination to require vesting of health benefits. Because
Section 510 militates against a finding that employee benefits are per-
manent, the court was correct in finding that McGann was not dis-
100. Id. at 456. While Reynolds Metals involved pension plans, its logic has been ex-
tended to cases involving welfare benefit plans. See, e.g., Musto v. American Gen-
eral Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1020
(1989)(stating that the principle articulated in Reynolds Metals applies with at
least as much force to welfare plans).
101. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,407-08 (5th Cir. 1991). The reference to
cost-saving is interesting in light of the fact that neither H & H nor General
American Life had argued strenuously in their briefs opposing certiorari that
cost-saving was the crux of their argument in support of their position; rather,
their argument, while certainly based upon cost savings, was that an employer
has the absolute right to change or terminate benefits of a plan regardless of the
reason. See generally Petition, supra note 74; Brief of General American, supra
note 10. One reason H & H and General American may have avoided raising the
issue of cost-savings is that it is not a particularly strong argument; a recent study
reported that the estimated lifetime cost of HIV and AIDS, from initial infection
to death, is $85,333 per victim. See Lawrence K. Altman, Cost of AIDS Care in
U.S. Is Seen at $5.8 Billion in '91, N.Y. TImEs, June 20, 1991, at A16. Compare
those costs to other catastrophic illnesses and injuries: According to estimates
from the mid-eighties, a case of kidney disease costs an average of $158,000, para-
plegia resulting from a car accident costs an average of $68,000, and myocardial
infarction costs an average of $66,000. See Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS, Employment
and Unemployment, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 959 n.220 (1989).
102. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991).
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criminated against for the purpose of interfering with a right to which
he may have become entitled.
The Fifth Circuit concluded by expressing the employer's right to
"discriminate" in the terms of a plan. "[Section 510] does not prohibit
an employer from electing not to cover or continue to cover AIDS,
while covering or continuing to cover other catastrophic illnesses,
even though the employer's decision in this respect may stem from
some 'prejudice' against AIDS or its victims generally."103 Because
the actions of H & H did not operate to change the employee-employer
relationship, the court was correct in its affirmance of the district
court's order granting summary judgement.104 As General American
argued, "[m]odification of employee benefits may present a hardship
to some members of the plan, but the overall benefit is realized by the
majority when the plan remains solvent."105
C. Conclusions from McGann
While McGann is sure to bring forth more fervent cries of discrimi-
nation from AIDS activists and employee groups, an examination of
the purpose and provisions of ERISA reveals the soundness of the
Fifth Circuit's holding. Health benefits are not insurance,106 and to
the extent that employers see fit to offer benefit plans, there must
remain the ability to amend or terminate those benefits to adapt to
changing social and medical costs. Without this freedom, employers
such as H & H would have a disincentive to offer any benefits. While a
knee-jerk reaction to McGann is that the Supreme Court erred in re-
fusing to hear the case, the current state of the law would have re-
103. Id. at 408.
104. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
105. Brief of General American, supra note 10, at 12.
106. Several post-McGann articles demonstrate that many columnists are unable or
unwilling to differentiate between traditional insurance and ancillary employer-
provided health benefits. One particularly shallow editorial described McGann
as "[t]he latest horror: Your employer may be able to rewrite your insurance pol-
icy to cover every illness but yours." The editorial" took the position that
"[i]nsurance companies and employers shouldn't be allowed to refuse coverage
for people who grow ill," and that "[i]f refusing coverage once people become ill is
legal, then health insurance is worthless." Tragic Case Shows Need For New
Health Rules, USA TODAY, May 27, 1992, at 08A. "The justices and lawmakers
still have a chance to do the right thing for millions of others. They should make
insurance do what it's supposed to do." Id. The author of the editorial was obvi-
ously unschooled in both the complexities of the federal statute as well as the
facts of McGann. Had McGann been covered by "insurance" rather than an em-
ployer-sponsored welfare benefit plan, neither H & H nor the insurance company
could have prevented his collection of benefits, provided McGann paid his premi-
ums. Moreover, unlike employee benefits under an employer-sponsored health
plan, insurance is generally renewable at the discretion of the insured. The USA
TODAY article simply exemplifies the type of unfortunately fashionable rhetoric
which comprised several other editorials subsequent to McGann.
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quired the Court to reach the same conclusion as the district and
circuit courts. The obvious response to employees is to purchase ac-
tual health insurance; if the purchase of insurance is impossible for
AIDS victims, then the problem lies with the insurance industry, not
with employee benefit plans. Perhaps President Clinton's emphasis
on a revamped system of nationwide health care will lead to a reason-
able and realistic solution for employees such as McGann.1 0 7 Requir-
ing self-funded plan benefits to vest, however, is a giant step toward
eliminating employer-offered benefit plans. Employers simply are not
bound to offer permanent benefits to their employees, nor should they
be.
D. The Americans With Disabilities Act Does Not Prohibit Employers
From Terminating or Amending Plan Benefits.
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA")108 for the salutary purpose of eliminating discrimination
aimed at the forty-three million Americans with mental or physical
disabilities.109 The ADA is intended to "provide clear, strong, consis-
tent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individ-
uals with disabilities."110 After the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari, several commentators and attorneys predicted that the pas-
sage of the ADA would prevent employers from terminating plan ben-
efits in the future.1 1  An examination of the language, legislative
107. President Clinton has specifically criticized McGann: "I oppose the decision of
the Bush Justice Department to support allowing employers to cut off insurance
to employees with AIDS by rewriting the policies after AIDS is discovered."
Dena Bunis and Timothy M. Phelps, A 'NO'for AIDS; Top Court Won't Take
Insurance Case, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1992, at 17.
108. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.(104 Stat.)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213)(Supp. III 1991)).
109. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1), (b)(1)(Supp.
III 1991).
110. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)(Supp. III 1991).
The ADA brings within its ambit persons with AIDS or HIV. See H.R. REP. No.
485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
111. "Ihe 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act should adequately protect employees
who fall ill or incur huge medical bills because of accidents. The act, which pro-
hibits employers from discriminating against disabled employees, could be inter-
preted to cover those with acute or chronic illnesses such as AIDS, experts say.
Simply put, cutting off benefits would be a form of discrimination." James M.
Gomez, Health Benefits Case May Spark Reform; Self-Insured Employer's Denial
of Coverage of AIDS Seen As Catalyst to Change in Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1992, at 7. According to attorney Mary Lynn Eubanks of Chicago, "similar cases
might well be decided differently starting next year, when the Americans with
Disabilities Act, passed by Congress in 1990, begins to take effect. 'The legislative
history indicates that AIDS will be among the conditions protected' under the act,
which will be binding on companies with 25 or more employers as of July 26."
Court Lets Firm Slash AIDS Health Benefits, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1991, at M.
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history and purpose of the ADA, however, establishes that the ADA
does not prohibit employers from amending or terminating health
benefit plans.
The ADA proscribes discrimination on the basis of a disability
against "a qualified individual with a disability ... in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of em-
ployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment."112 For the purposes of the
ADA, discrimination includes:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a[n] ... employee in a way that
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such... employee because of
the disability of such... employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that
has the effect of subjecting [an employer's] qualified... employee with a disa-
bility to the discrimination prohibited [and] includes .. providing fringe bene-
fits... ;
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration... (A) that
have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability. 1 13
The ADA also defines "qualified individual with a disability" as an
"individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions of the [employ-
ment]."-114 An employer is required to make reasonable
accommodations for qualified disabled individuals unless such accom-
modations would create an undue hardship on the employer.115
The ADA prevents an employer from denying employees equal ac-
cess to group health care based on a disability.11 6 Therefore, an em-
ployee with a disability may not be denied the opportunity to
participate in an employee benefit plan because of a disability. 117 Sim-
ilarly, the ADA mandates that a qualified applicant may not be denied
employment simply because the employee benefit plan does not cover
AIDS treatment or because the employer anticipated future increased
112. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)(Supp. III 1991).
113. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(Supp. III 1991); see
also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.4 to 1630.8 (1992).
114. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)(Supp. III 1991); see
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)-(n)(1992).
115. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(Supp. III
1991); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1992). The Act defines "undue hardship" as an
action which requires significant difficulty or expense, in light of several criteria.
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)(Supp. III
1991); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1992).
116. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)(Supp. III
1991)(defining discrimination as limiting, segregating, or classifying an employee
based on disability in a manner that affects opportunities).
117. H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 494 (hereinafter House Report).
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expenses for such treatment.118
The ADA also prohibits employers from denying coverage to dis-
abled persons independent of "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks."119 Therefore, an employee benefit plan
may not restrict or limit coverage for an individual employee with
AIDS absent an actuarial or underwriting risk classification. 12 0 Even
if an employer denies coverage to a disabled employee based on basic
principles of risk classification, the employer violates the ADA if the
actions are a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the ADA.121 No defi-
nition of "subterfuge" is given.
The absence of any case law leaves the door open for advocates of
disabled employees to argue that the ADA would prevent employers
from taking steps to eliminate or reduce plan benefits. Georgetown
University Law Center Visiting Professor Chai R. Feldblum, who
helped draft the original ADA introduced at the 101st Congress, 122 be-
lieves that the ADA's requirement of an actuarial or risk classifica-
tion123 will prevent employers from eliminating benefits in the future.
Professor Feldblum contends that the ADA restricts an employer
from putting a cap on "one disability and not another, absent actuarial
evidence that one costs more than the other."124 The result, explains
Professor Feldblum, is that an employer must have financial evidence
that AIDS costs more than other long-term illnesses,125 and she be-
lieves, apparently correctly,126 that an employer may not be able to
make such a showing.
Washington, D.C. attorney David A. Copus takes a different view
of the effect of the ADA on an employer's right to eliminate or reduce
benefits. According to Copus, "the ADA simply bars employers from
using disability-specific limitations in benefit plans specifically to dis-
criminate in non-fringe-benefit aspects of employment such as wages
or hiring, but allows employers to continue other disability-specific
limitations."12 7 In other words, Copus believes that an employer may
not refuse to hire a person with HIV, nor may the employer pay an
HIV-infected employee less; however, the employer may decline to of-
118. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 84-86 (1989), (hereinafter Senate
Report).
119. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(Supp. III 1991).
120. House Report, supra note 117, at 71.
121. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(Supp. III 1991).
122. See Employer Can Reduce Insurance Benefits of AIDS Victims, [Nov.-Dec.] Empl.
Prac. Guide (CCH) No. 458, at 3 (Nov. 16, 1992)(hereinafter Employer).
123. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(Supp. III 1991). See
also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. Employer, supra note 122, at 3.
125. Id.
126. For a comparison between AIDS and some other long-term injuries or conditions,
see supra text accompanying note 101.
127. Employer, supra note 122, at 3.
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fer or eliminate ancillary benefits for AIDS provided that the em-
ployer does not single out a specific employee in the denial or
reduction of benefits.12 8
The issue of the effect the ADA has upon ERISA has been raised
both prior and subsequent to the Court's denial of certiorari in Mc-
Gann.129 Several other commentators have expressed the hope that
the ADA would prevent an employer such as H & H from terminating
welfare plan benefits for employees suffering from HIV or AIDS.130
Indeed, the language of the ADA seems on its face to prevent an em-
ployer such as H & H from changing the terms of an employee benefit
plan. However, the view that the ADA prevents plan termination or
modification fails to take into account the legislative history and pur-
pose of the ADA, as well as prior case law interpreting statutes with
similar language. A close examination of the Act reveals that the
ADA was enacted with the intent that it be interpreted harmoniously
with the provisions of ERISA.
The term "subterfuge" is hardly unique to the ADA. Language
substantially similar to that used in the ADA was also used in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA").131 The ADEA,
unlike the ADA, has been subject to judicial interpretation. The anal-
ysis and conclusions reached by the Supreme Court in interpreting
language similar to that used in the ADA indicate that should the
Court continue interpretation a change in plan benefits would not in
itself constitute a violation of the ADA.
In Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts,132 the
Court interpreted the term "subterfuge" as used in the ADEA. In
Betts, the Court stated that "subterfuge" is to be interpreted within its
ordinary meaning as "a scheme, plan, strategem, or artifice of eva-
sion."133 The Court then held that an employee benefit plan could not
be considered a subterfuge for discrimination "unless it discriminates
in a manner forbidden by the substantive provisions of the Act."134
Thus, "an employee benefit plan adopted prior to the enactment of the
ADEA cannot be a subterfuge,"' 35 and in the case of post-ADEA
128. Id.
129. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cerl denied, 113 S.Ct.
482 (1992).
130. See Gomez, supra note 111 and accompanying text.
131. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988), amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-30 (Supp. III 1991). The
ADEA provided in pertinent part that employers may "observe the terms of...
any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter." Id
§ 623(f)(2). See generally Sohlgren, supra note 2, at 1288-94.
132. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
133. Id. at 167 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977)).
134. Id. at 176.
135. Id. at 168.
[Vol. 72:860
ERISA PLANS AND AIDS BENEFITS
plans, the employee must prove that a plan provision "actually was
intended to serve the purpose of discriminating in some nonfringe-
benefit aspect of the employment relation."3S The result of Betts and
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 3 7 an earlier case construing the
language of the ADEA, was that plans adopted before the enactment
of the ADEA and plans that discriminated solely in some aspect of
fringe-benefits did not violate the act and were within a "safe
harbor."138
Congress amended the ADEA by passing the Older Workers Bene-
fit Protection Act of 1990,139 and several commentators suggest that
the prior interpretations of the ADEA can not be used to interpret
similar ADA terminology. However, while drafting the provisions of
the ADA, Congress used virtually the identical language as contained
in the ADEA. Congress was presumably aware of the prior Supreme
Court interpretations of the "subterfuge" language;140 yet, it adopted
that language in the ADA. Thus, Supreme Court precedent indicates
that a similar definition of "subterfuge" would be assigned to the lan-
guage of the ADA, and the McMann/Betts safe harbor will apply. The
ADA is not violated absent a showing of discrimination in a nonfringe-
benefit aspect of employment.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA reveals that Con-
gress realized that the ADA and ERISA provisions would at times
conflict; Congress therefore acknowledged ERISA's preemption of
state laws which relate to self-insured plans. While self-insured plans
are not expressly exempt from the prohibitions of the ADA, Senator
Harkin explained that self-insured plans may still avail themselves of
ERISA preemption of state law. "There was some concern raised on
the part of those who administer self-insurance plans that the lan-
guage of section [sic] 501(c)92 [sic] could be read to affect the preemp-
tion doctrine of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. Congress does not intend in this bill to affect in any way such
preemption doctrine .. ,"141 Additionally, the House Committee on
Education and Labor report states that "self-insured plans, which are
currently governed by the preemption provisions of [ERISA], are still
governed by that preemption provision .... Of course, under the
ADA, the provisions of these plans must conform with the require-
136. Id- at 181 (emphasis added).
137. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
138. See generally David A Copus and Glen D. Nager, Discrimination Against Mental
Disorders?, LEGAL TiMEs, Aug. 31, 1992, at 24.
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-30 (Supp. III 1992).
140. See generally Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158
(1989); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
141. 135 CONG. REC. S10,776 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989)(statement of Sen. Harkin).
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ments of ERISA .... "142
The statements of Senator Harkin and the language of the House
Committee report raise the inference that by not affecting ERISA's
preemption doctrine, Congress left self-funded plans free to amend or
terminate plan benefits, provided that the termination or amendment
does not violate the provisions of ERISA. Therefore, if a self-funded
plan terminates or amends plan benefits consistent with the provi-
sions of ERISA, there should be no violation of the ADA. The legisla-
tive history of the ADA bolsters the conclusion that the ADA would
not prevent an employer from terminating or amending benefits
under a plan. Because the prohibitions of the ADA do not effect the
ERISA provisions regarding self-funded plans, McGann would have
had no greater success had he made his claim under the ADA rather
than ERISA.
E. The Proposed Group Health Plan Nondiscrimination Act of 1993
Would Provide a Disincentive for Employers to Offer
Employment Benefits.
U.S. Representative William J. Hughes of New Jersey apparently
realized that the ADA was not intended to affect the employer's right
to terminate or amend plan benefits. On February 18, 1993, Hughes
introduced into Congress the Group Health Plan Non-Discrimination
Act of 1993 ("Group Health Act").143 The purpose of the Bill was to
amend ERISA in order "to ensure nondiscrimination in benefits pro-
vided under group health plans, and to provide for adequate notice of
adoption of material coverage restrictions under group health plans
and effective remedies for violations of such title with respect to such
plans."144 In order to effectuate its stated purpose, the Group Health
Act provides:
(1) It shall be unlawful discrimination for purposes of subsection (A) to
take any action to cancel or reduce a benefit of a participant or beneficiary
under a group health plan (by plan amendment, or plan termination, change
in insured status of the plan, change of insurer under the plan, or any other
means), if-
(A) such action is specifically related to one or more particular diseases
or medical conditions,
(B) such participant or beneficiary is undergoing,at the time such ac-
tion is taken, a course of treatment related to any such disease or medical
condition, and
(C) a valid claim under the plan reasonably related to such course of
treatment has been submitted to the plan by or on behalf of such partici-
142. H.R. REP. No. 90 H343-6, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 420.
143. H.R. 975, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was originally introduced in the
1992 Congress and contained substantially the same language. See H.R. 6147, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
144. H.R. 975, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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pant or beneficiary prior to the taking of such action.1 4 5
The Act also implicates the levels of lifetime benefits under a plan:
.... It shall be unlawful for a group health plan to discriminate among
diseases or medical conditions with respect to levels of lifetime benefit cover-
age provided to similarly situated participants and beneficiaries under the
plan.14 6
Finally, the Act allows a plan to escape the Act's "benefit vesting," but
places the onus on the plan sponsors to show such relief is warranted:
The requirements of this paragraph are met if the sponsor of such group
health plan demonstrates to the secretary by a preponderance of the evidence
that such sponsor will be unable to continue such plan unless granted relief
from the applicable requirements of [the Act] .... 147
The intent of Representative Hughes is certainly admirable. Good in-
tentions, however, do not always create model legislation, and the pas-
sage of the Group Health Act, which is aimed at all changes in
employee benefit plans, would have a devastating effect on employer-
sponsored group health plans.
As costs of health care skyrocket,148 employers are faced with a
dilemma: continue to provide benefit plans with traditional insurance
and eventually be forced to abandon the plan due to increased costs, or
attempt to insure the soundness of the plan by finding alternatives to
traditional insurance. One cost-saving strategy has been for employ-
ers to switch from traditional insurance to self-insurance. In addition
to availing themselves of preemption of state law,149 employers who
self-fund their plans can expect to save between fifteen and twenty
percent of the costs of traditionally insured plans.150 As a result of
rising medical and health costs, and in light of the potential savings
involved, employers in recent years have increasingly turned toward
self-insurance to fund their employee-benefit plans. While the exact
number of employers who self-fund their plans is unknown, most esti-
mates are that about sixty-five percent of all employers have turned to
self-insurance.'5'
The passage of the Group Health Act would have a significant im-
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id
148. According to a recent study by the consulting firm of A. Foster Higgins & Com-
pany, the average rise in health care costs was four times the rate of inflation in
1991. The costs of indemnity plans, which is comprised of traditional insurance
coverage, rose by thirteen percent. Frank Swoboda, Onward and Upward Health
Costs Kept Up Their Climb in '91, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1992, p. h02.
149. See supra notes 21-46 and accompanying text.
150. Jane Applegate, Seeking Affordable Health Care Taxes Many a Firm's Ingenuity,
L.A. TIraEs, Feb. 16, 1990, p. 3, part D, col. 4. Applegate quoted Robert Turell of
Insurance Design Associates as stating that one company with 250 employees
saved about $ 150,000 by partially self-insuring.
151. Swoboda, supra note 148.
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pact on the self-funded employee benefit plans which now comprise
over half of all plans. The attraction of self-funding is in the preemp-
tion of state law, while the necessity of self-funding results from the
need to escape rising medical costs and the administrative expenses of
traditionally insured plans. If passed, the Act would remove the at-
traction of self-funding by requiring plan benefits to effectively vest,
while at the same time offering nothing to the small employers facing
increased costs of employee benefit plans. Employer-sponsored health
benefits do not fall from the heavens like manna, and therefore, the
exemption from vesting is the only real incentive for employers to of-
fer employee benefit plans. The Group Health Act seeks to remove
that incentive from the employee benefit arena.
The shortcoming of the Group Health Act is that it fails to account
for the effect vesting would have on all participants of the plan. In the
case of H & H, a company with 300 employees, two groups may be
recognized: those employees currently affected by AIDS who would
draw benefits under the plan (representing 00.33% of potential partici-
pants), and those employees who are not currently affected (repre-
senting 99.67% of potential participants). To require benefits to "vest"
would be to provide permanent benefits to the .33%, and could easily
deplete the entire plan fund in the event of a truly catastrophic, unfor-
seen illness. If such a situation were to arise, all plan participants,
rather than just McGann, may confront the spectre of having no avail-
able health benefits, a result due solely to a rule that a plan sponser or
fiduciary may not modify or amend a plan.
Currently, an employer such as H & H has incentives to offer self-
funded plan benefits; self-funding saves money1 5 2 and it provides pre-
emption of state statutes which mandate certain benefits.1 53 Absent
the ability to amend the plan benefits to protect the majority of em-
ployees, an employer has little incentive to offer any benefits and ac-
tually has an incentive to terminate existing benefits, if possible, in
which case 100% of employees would be harmed.
The likely effect of the passage of the Group Health Act would be
twofold: (1) many employers who currently self-insure would elect to
eliminate benefits altogether, and (2) plans which are retained would
contain minimal benefits. Thus, the passage of the Group Health Act
would harm the majority of the very group it endeavors to protect. An
act which actually encourages employers to reduce total plan benefits
to its participants could hardly be said to further the interest of em-
ployees in general. The rationale of the Group Health Act calls to
mind the old adage that "the greatest folly is wisdom spun too fine."
To suggest that the passage of the Group Health Act would protect the
152. See Applegate, supra note 150 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.70-3A (West Supp. 1993); see also supra note 45
and accompanying text.
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interests of employees by decreasing the likelihood that employers
would offer benefits is indeed spinning the wisdom exceedingly fine.
Craig C. Dirrim, '93
